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1 Introduction
Many industries present horizontal and vertical oligopoly structures where upstream sellers deal
with downstream buyers. This is particularly the case on markets where manufacturers sell their
products through retailing chains, for example for most processed food items in supermarkets.
These vertical relationships matter considerably for the nal price setting by retailers, for competi-
tion analysis and market power estimation. The nature of contracts and the sharing of bargaining
power in the vertical chain are then important determinants of equilibrium outcomes.
This paper proposes to model and estimate structurally such a competition game where non
linear contracts are two part tari¤s contracts. It presents the rst empirical estimation of a structu-
ral model taking into account explicitly the endogenous buyer power of downstream players facing
contracts o¤ered by the upstream level. We consider vertical contracts between manufacturers and
retailers where resale price maintenance may be used with two part tari¤s and we allow retailers to
have some endogenous buyer power coming from the horizontal competition of manufacturers. Our
contribution allows to recover price-cost margins at the upstream and downstream levels in these
di¤erent structural models from the industry structure and from estimates of demand parameters.
Recent works in empirical industrial organization have started taking into account the strategic
behavior of retailers in the vertical chain as intermediaries between upstream producers and consu-
mers. As information on wholesale prices, on marginal costs of production or distribution, and on
vertical restraints are generally di¢ cult to observe, methods often rely on demand side data and
require structural modelling of the supply side. Usual empirical industrial organization methods
propose to address the estimation of price-cost margins with the estimation of structural models
of competition on di¤erentiated products markets such as cars, computers, breakfast cereals, beer
(Berry, 1994, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995, Nevo, 1998, 2000, 2001, Pinkse and Slade, 2004,
Slade, 2004, Ivaldi and Martimort, 2004, Ivaldi and Verboven, 2005, Dubois and Jodar-Rosell, 2010)
and recent research studies identication with relaxed assumption on strategic behavior (Rosen,
2007, Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii, 2006). Until recently, most papers in this literature assumed
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that retailers act as neutral pass-through intermediaries or charge exogenous constant margins as
if manufacturers directly set consumer prices. Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi (2003) showed the
important role of distributors on prices and the strategic role of retailers has been recently em-
phasized in the economics and marketing empirical literatures. While each paper having its own
focus, a stream of research followed with an explicit consideration of the strategic roles of retailer,
for example : Goldberg and Verboven (2001), Manuszak (2001), Mortimer (2008), Ho (2006), Ho,
Ho and Mortimer (2008), Sudhir (2001), Villas-Boas and Zhao (2004), Asker (2005), Villas-Boas
(2007), Hellerstein (2008), Meza and Sudhir (2009), Bonnet and Dubois (2010). In particular, Sud-
hir (2001) considers the strategic interactions between manufacturers and a single retailer on a local
market and focuses on a linear pricing model leading to double marginalization. Meza and Sudhir
(2009) study how private labels a¤ect the bargaining power of retailers. Ho (2006) studies the
welfare e¤ects of vertical contracting between hospitals and health maintenance organizations in
the US. Ho (2009) looks at the role of managed care health insurers on the choice of hospitals using
the inequality framework of Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2006). Asker (2005) considers the role
of foreclosure in the strategic choices of vertical contracts on the beer market. Hellerstein (2008)
explains imperfect pass-through again in the beer market. Manuszak (2001) studies the impact of
upstream mergers on retail gasoline markets using a structural model allowing downstream prices
to be related to upstream price mark-ups and wholesale prices chosen by upstream gasoline rene-
ries. Hellerstein and Villas-Boas (2010) study the role of foreign outsourcing on the pass-through
rate of upstream part suppliers in the automobile industry. Villas-Boas (2009) studies the e¤ects of
a ban on wholesale price discrimination on the German co¤ee market. Bonnet, Dubois and Villas-
Boas (2010) study the e¤ects of vertical restraints, and in particular of non linear contracts with
resale price maintenance, on the cost pass through of the world market price of co¤ee on retail
prices in Germany.
These recent developments introducing retailersstrategic behavior consider mostly cases where
competition between producers and/or retailers remains under linear pricing (like in Sudhir, 2001,
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Brenkers and Verboven, 2006) and vertical contracts are quite simple. Villas-Boas (2007) considers
the possibility that vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers make pricing strategies
depart from double marginalization by setting alternatively wholesale margins or retail margins to
zero. Bonnet and Dubois (2010) extends the analysis modelling explicitly two-part tari¤s contracts
with or without resale price maintenance, assuming that the bargaining power between manufac-
turers and retailers is exogenously xed.
However, the consideration of endogenous buyer power within a vertical relationship coming
from horizontal competition at the upstream level has never been taken into account. Here, we allow
retailers to benet from some endogenous buyer power when facing manufacturers contracts o¤ers.
The endogenous buyer power comes from the available competing o¤ers by other manufacturers
that can be used as outside options by retailers in addition to the explicit consideration of prots
that retailers can always entail from their private label own brands.
We show how we can identify and estimate price-cost margins at the retailer and manufacturer
levels under the di¤erent competition scenarios considered without observing marginal costs and
wholesale prices. Modelling explicitly optimal two part tari¤s contracts (with or without resale price
maintenance) allows to recover the pricing strategy of manufacturers and retailers. We do not only
recover the total price-cost margins as functions of demand parameters but also the division of
these margins between manufacturers and retailers under some additional assumptions on the cost
structure allowing to estimate unobserved wholesale prices. Using non nested test procedures as in
Bonnet and Dubois (2010), we can test between the di¤erent models using restrictions on marginal
costs or exogenous variables that shift the marginal costs of production and distribution.
We apply our modelling to the bottled water market in France using estimates of a mixed logit
demand model on individual level data. Empirical evidence shows that two part tari¤s contracts
are used with no resale price maintenance and that the buyer power of supermarket chains is
endogenously determined by the o¤ers of the multiple manufacturers. This market presents a high
degree of concentration both at the manufacturer and retailer levels. It is to be noted that it is
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actually even more concentrated at the manufacturer level with only three large manufacturers
than at the retailer level where we have in France seven large retailing chains.
In section 2, we rst present some stylized facts on the bottled water market in France, an
industry where the questions of vertical relationships and competition of manufacturers and retai-
lers seem worth studying. Section 3 describes the main methodological contribution on the supply
side. We show how price-cost margins can be recovered with demand parameters, with the industry
structure and di¤erent assumptions on vertical contracts. Section 4 presents the demand model, its
identication and estimation method on individual data as well as the methodology developed to
test between the di¤erent models. In section 5, we discuss the empirical results and tests. Section
6 concludes and some appendices follow.
2 The Bottled Water Market in France
2.1 Stylized Facts
The bottled water market is an important sector of the French food processing industry : 68.2
billion liters were sold in 2006 (Agreste, 2009). It is also a highly concentrated sector since the three
main producers (Nestlé Waters, Danone, and Castel) share 90% of the total production of the sector.
Two types of water coexist, namely, natural mineral water and spring water. The denomination
of "natural mineral" water is o¢ cially recognized by an agreement from the French Ministry of
Health and puts forward properties favorable to health. Composition must be guaranteed as well
as the consistency of a set of qualitative criteria : mineral content, visual aspects, and taste. The
exploitation of a "spring water" source requires a license provided by local authorities and an
agreement of the local health committee but the water composition is not required to be constant.
The di¤erences between the quality requirements involved in the certication of these two kinds of
water may explain part of the large di¤erences that exists between the shelf prices of the mineral
water brands and the spring water brands. Moreover, mineral water brands are usually more
national and highly advertised.
In France, households buy bottled water mostly in supermarkets (80% of total sales) and on
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average, these sales represent 1.7% of the total turnover of supermarkets, the bottled water shelf
being one of the most productive. Manufacturers thus deal mainly their brands through retailing
chains which are also highly concentrated on food retailing (the market share of the rst ve
being around 80% of total food retailing). Since the late 90s, food retailing chains have developed
private labels (also called store brands) and the increase in the number of private labels tends to
be accompanied by a reduction of the market shares of the main national brands.
This market is thus very concentrated and competition concerns are usually put forward. Re-
gulation of the food retailing and supermarket industry is quite important in France with strong
rules on zoning and entry of supermarket stores (Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002, Jodar-Rosell, 2008)
and also detailed rules about vertical contracting between manufacturers and retailers. On this
last regulation, it has been shown in Bonnet and Dubois (2010), which studied the same market
with aggregate data from 1998-2000, that resale price maintenance (RPM) with non linear vertical
contracts seemed to explain the observed pricing. This evidence is consistent with the fact that the
Galland act (introduced in 1996) prohibited resale at loss for retailers and dened the threshold
level of prices from wholesale list prices not including any backward margins. Implementing RPM
implicitly was then feasible with this regulation. Such concern led to the removal of the Galland
act by the competition authority with a new law called the "Dutreil II" elaborated in 2005 and
e¤ective on January 2006. There is thus a policy interest in studying competition and pricing rela-
tionships after 2006 which is done in this paper in addition to estimating the demand on individual
data and allowing endogenous buyer power for retailers.
2.2 Data and Variables
Our data were collected by the company TNS World Panel and consists of a survey on hou-
seholdsconsumption in France using a home-scan technique. We use a representative sample of
French households for the year 2006 for which we have information on their purchases of all food
products. The data provides a description of the main characteristics of the goods whose purchases
are recorded over the whole year. We thus have quantity, price, brand, date and store of pur-
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chase. We use the information on all bottles of water purchased. For the purpose of estimation of
our structural models, we will consider the purchases in the seven most important retailers which
represent 70.9% of the total purchases of the sample. We take into account the most important
brands, that is : ve national brands of mineral water, one national brand of spring water, one
retailer private label brand of mineral water and one retailer private label spring water. The pur-
chases of these eight brands represent 69.3% of the purchases of the seven retailers. The national
brands are produced by three di¤erent manufacturers : Danone, Nestlé and Castel. We consider
all other non-alcoholic refreshing drinks as the outside good.
We consider eight brands sold in seven retailer chains, which gives 56 di¤erentiated products.
For each of these products, we compute an average price for each month using all observed purchases
by households during the month. These prices are in euros per liter. Table 1 presents some rst
descriptive statistics on some of the main variables used.
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max
Price in C=/liter 0.251 0.213 0.127 0.113 0.929
Price in C=/liter : Mineral Water 0.369 0.359 0.034 0.200 0.929
Price in C=/liter : Spring Water 0.148 0.134 0.034 0.113 0.313
Mineral water dummy (0/1) 0.66 1 0.47 0 1
Table 1 : Summary Statistics
We also use data from the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (IN-
SEE) allowing to characterize supply side cost shifters in this industry with the plastic price, a
wage salary index, and diesel oil prices.
3 Competition and Vertical Relationships Between Manu-
facturers and Retailers
We now introduce an oligopoly model with vertical relationships. As in Rey and Vergé (2004)
and Bonnet and Dubois (2010), we consider linear pricing and two part tari¤s contracts but allow
also retailers to benet from some endogenous buyer power when facing manufacturerso¤ers.
Lets introduce the model considering R retailers and F multi-brand manufacturers. We denote
J the number of di¤erentiated products dened by the couple brand-retailer among which J 0 are
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manufacturer branded products and J  J 0 are store brands (also called private labels). We denote
by Sr the set of products sold by retailer r and by Gf the set of products produced by rm f .
3.1 Linear Pricing
As in Rey and Vergé (2004), Villas-Boas (2007), Bonnet and Dubois (2010), among others, we
consider the game where manufacturers set wholesale prices rst, and retailers follow by setting
the retail prices. We obtain the usual double marginalization result. For private labels, prices are
chosen by the retailer who bears both retailing and production costs. Using backward induction,
we consider the retailers problem who wants to maximize its prot denoted r for retailer r and
equal to
r =
X
j2Sr
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p)
where pj is the retail price of product j sold by retailer r, wj is the wholesale price paid by retailer
r for product j, cj is the retailers (constant) marginal cost of distribution for product j, sj(p) is
the market share of product j, p is the vector of retail prices of all products.
Remark that we normalized the prot by the population size which amounts to dene prots
as per household prot. Since we will take into account an outside good option denoted good 0,
this normalization is equivalent as if we had used the total demand of each good instead of market
shares.
Assuming that a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices exists and that equilibrium
prices are strictly positive, the price of any product j sold by retailer r must satisfy the rst-order
condition
sj +
X
s2Sr
(ps   ws   cs)@ss
@pj
= 0; for all j 2 Sr: (1)
Now, we dene Ir as the ownership matrix (size (J  J)) of the retailer r that is diagonal and
whose jth element is equal to 1 if the retailer r sells product j and zero otherwise. Let Sp be the
market shares response matrix to retailer prices, containing the rst derivatives of all market shares
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with respect to all retail prices, i.e.
Sp 
0B@
@s1
@p1
: : : @sJ@p1
...
...
@s1
@pJ
: : : @sJ@pJ
1CA
In vector notation, the rst order condition (1) implies that the vector  of retailer rs margins
(rows corresponding to products not sold by r are set to zero), i.e. the retail price p minus the
wholesale price w minus the marginal cost of distribution c, is1
  p  w   c =   (IrSpIr) 1 Irs(p) (2)
Remark that for private labels, this price-cost margin is in fact the total price-cost margin p  c
which amounts to replace the wholesale price w by the marginal cost of production  in this
formula.
Concerning the manufacturersbehavior, we assume they maximize prot choosing the whole-
sale prices wj of their own products and given the retailersresponse (1). The prot of manufacturer
f is given by
f =
X
j2Gf
(wj   j)sj(p(w))
where j is the manufacturers (constant) marginal cost of production of product j. Assuming the
existence of a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in wholesale prices between manufacturers,
the rst order conditions are
sj +
X
s2Gf
X
l=1;::;J
(ws   s)
@ss
@pl
@pl
@wj
= 0; for all j 2 Gf : (3)
We denote If the ownership matrix of manufacturer f that is diagonal and whose jth element is
equal to one if j is produced by the manufacturer f and zero otherwise.
We introduce Pw the matrix (J  J) of retail prices responses to wholesale prices, containing
1Abusing notations, we consider the generalized inverse when noting the inverse of non invertible matrices, which
means that for example

2 0
0 0
 1
=

1=2 0
0 0

.
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the rst derivatives of the J retail prices with respect to the J 0 wholesale prices.
Pw 
0BBBBBB@
@p1
@w1
:: @pJ@wJ0
:: @pJ@w1
...
...
...
@p1
@wJ0
:: @pJ0@wJ0
:: @pJ@wJ0
:: :: :: :: ::
0 :: 0 :: 0
1CCCCCCA
Remark that the last J   J 0 rows of this matrix are zero because they correspond to private label
products for which wholesale prices have no meaning.
Then, we can write the rst order conditions (3) in matrix form and the vector of manufacturers
margins is2
   w    =  (IfPwSpIf ) 1Ifs(p) (4)
The rst derivatives of retail prices with respect to wholesale prices depend on the strategic inter-
actions between manufacturers and retailers.
When we assume that retailers follow manufacturers in setting the retail prices given the who-
lesale prices, Pw can be deduced from the di¤erentiation of the retailers rst order conditions (1)
with respect to wholesale price, i.e. for j 2 Sr and k = 1; ::; J 0
X
l=1;::;J
@sj(p)
@pl
@pl
@wk
 1fk2Srg
@sk(p)
@pj
+
X
l2Sr
@sl(p)
@pj
@pl
@wk
+
X
l2Sr
(pl wl cl)
X
s=1;::;J
@2sl(p)
@pj@ps
@ps
@wk
= 0 (5)
where 1fk2Srg = 1 if k 2 Sr and 0 otherwise. Dening Spjp the matrix of the second derivatives of
the market shares with respect to retail prices whose elements are :
Spjp 
0BB@
@2s1
@p1@pj
: : : @
2sJ
@p1@pj
... :
...
@2s1
@pJ@pj
: : : @
2sJ
@pJ@pj
1CCA ;
we can write equation (5) in matrix form3 :
Pw = IrSp(Ir   eIr) SpIr + IrS0pIr + (Sp1p Irj:::jSpJp Ir)Ir 1 (6)
where  = p   w   c, eIr is the ownership matrix of private labels of retailer r and Ir   eIr thus
designates the ownership matrix of national brands by retailer r. Equation (4) shows that one can
2Rows of this vector that correspond to private labels are zero.
3We use the notation (ajb) for horizontal concatenation of a and b.
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express the manufacturers price-cost margins vector   = w  as depending on the function s(p)
by replacing the expression (6) for Pw in (4).
3.2 Two-Part Tari¤s and Endogenous Retail Buyer Power
We now consider the case where manufacturers and retailers can sign two-part tari¤s contracts.
As in Rey and Vergé (2004) and Bonnet and Dubois (2010), we assume that manufacturers make
take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to retailers and characterize symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Rey and Vergé (2004) have proven the existence of equilibria under some assumptions on this
multiple common agency game. These contracts consist in the specication of franchise fees and
wholesale prices but also on retail prices in the case where manufacturers can use resale price
maintenance. All o¤ers are public4 and retailers simultaneously accept or reject. Contrary to Bonnet
and Dubois (2010), where it is assumed that if one o¤er is rejected then all contracts are refused
and retailers obtain a xed reservation utility, we allow the possibility that a retailer rejects a
contract while accepting others. Once o¤ers have been accepted, the retailers simultaneously set
their retail prices, demands and contracts are satised.
We consider that two-part tari¤s contracts are negotiated at the rm level and not by brand,
which implies that manufacturers use bundling o¤ers to retailers. This is likely to increase the
market power of multiproduct manufacturers and reduce the buyer power of retailers which depends
on the brand ownership structure of multiproduct manufacturers and on the presence of store
brands owned by retailers. Retailers can then refuse a manufacturers o¤ers and accept those of
other manufacturers but cannot refuse part of the brands o¤ered by a manufacturer while accepting
others owned by this same manufacturer.
The prot function of retailer r now writes :
r =
X
s2Sr
[(ps   ws   cs)ss(p)  Fs] (7)
where Fs is the franchise fee paid by the retailer r for selling product s 2 Sr (negative if backward
4This is a convenient benchmark case that can be justied in France by the nondiscrimination laws of the 1986
edict of free pricing which prevents the o¤er of di¤erent wholesale prices to purchasers who provide comparable
services.
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margins received by the retailer). The prot function of rm f is equal to
f =
X
s2Gf
[(ws   s)ss(p) + Fs]: (8)
Allowing retailers to enjoy some endogenous buyer power, we consider that retailers may be able to
refuse some contracts proposed by manufacturers while accepting other two-part tari¤s contracts.
Contract o¤ers are simultaneous but the incentive constraints of the retailers are such that contracts
o¤ered by a manufacturer to a retailer must provide to the retailer a prot at least as large as
the prot that the retailer would obtain when refusing the proposed contract but accepting all
other o¤ers. Moreover, it must be also that the retailers prots are at least larger than some xed
reservation utility level denoted 
r
for retailer r.
Thus, the manufacturers set the two-part tari¤s contracts parameters (wholesale prices and
xed fees) in order to maximize prots as in (8) subject to the following retailersparticipation
constraints
r  r; (9)
and incentive constraints
r 
X
s2SrnGfr
[(epfrs   ws   cs)ss(epfr)  Fs] (10)
for all r = 1; ::; R, where r is the retailers prot (7) when accepting all the o¤ers, where 
r
is
the retailer r reservation utility, where Gfr is the set of products owned by rm f and distributed
by retailer r, and epfr = (epfr1 ; ::; epfrJ ) is the vector of retail prices when the products of Gfr do not
exist (by convention we will have epfri = +1 if i 2 Gfr).
When the retailer r refuses the o¤ers of the manufacturer f , he can accept all other o¤ers and
sell all products not manufactured by f , whose set is denoted SrnGfr. The market share ss(epfr)
of each product of the set SrnGfr corresponds to the market share of product s when all products
in Gfr are absent.
Then, following Rey and Vergé (2004) arguments, since the manufacturers can always adjust
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the xed fees such that all the constraints (10) will be binding, we have 8r = 1; ::; R
X
s2Sr
[(ps   ws   cs)ss(p)  Fs] =
X
s2SrnGfr
[(epfrs   ws   cs)ss(epfr)  Fs]
In general, if constraints (10) are satised, the constraints (9) will be satised. The binding
constraints (10) imply that the sum of xed fees paid for the products of f sold through r is
X
s2Gfr
Fs =
X
s2Sr

(ps   ws   cs)ss(p)  (epfrs   ws   cs)ss(epfr)
because ss(epfr) = 0 when s 2 Gfr.
Using this expression, one can rewrite the prot of the manufacturer f as
f =
X
s2Gf
[(ws   s)ss(p) + Fs] =
X
s2Gf
(ws   s)ss(p) +
XR
r=1
X
s2Gfr
Fs
=
X
s2Gf
(ws   s)ss(p) +
XR
r=1
X
s2Sr

(ps   ws   cs)ss(p)  (epfrs   ws   cs)ss(epfr)
because [Rr=1Gfr = Gf (and Gfr \Gfr0 = ?). The manufacturers prot is then
f =
X
s2Gf
(ws   s)ss(p) +
JX
s=1
h
(ps   ws   cs)ss(p)  (epfr(s)s   ws   cs)ss(epfr(s))i (11)
where r(s) denotes the retailer of product s (2 f1; ::; Jg).
We will also consider a simpler case where constraints (10) do not exist because it is assumed
that if one o¤er is rejected then all o¤ers must be rejected as in Bonnet and Dubois (2010). Then,
the outside opportunities depend on a xed exogenous reservation utility and we will say that the
buyer power of retailer is exogenous.
3.2.1 With Resale Price Maintenance
Lets consider the case where manufacturers use resale price maintenance (RPM) in their
contracts with retailers. Then, manufacturers can choose retail prices while the wholesale prices
have no direct e¤ect on prot. In this case, the vectors of prices epfr are such that epfri = pi if
i =2 Gfr and the prot (11) of manufacturer f can then be written as5
f =
X
s2Gf
(ws   s)ss(p) +
XJ
s=1
(ps   ws   cs)
h
ss(p)  ss(epfr(s))i
5Because also ss(epfr(s)) = 0; epfrs = +1 for s 2 Gfr and by convention ss(epfr(s))epfrs = 0.
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Remark that with RPM, the retail buyer power does not change the retail equilibrium prices
(but only the xed fees in the contracts).
Indeed, with RPM, the previous expression of the manufacturer prot can be written
f =
X
s2Gf
((ps   s   cs)ss(p) +
X
s=2Gf
(ps   ws   cs)ss(p) 
JX
s=1
(ps   ws   cs)ss(epfr(s))
where the part
P
s2Gf
(ps s cs)ss(p)+
P
s=2Gf
(ps ws cs)ss(p) is the expression of the prot when
there is no incentive constraint and thus the buyer power is xed exogenously and  PJs=1(ps  
ws   cs)ss(epfr(s)) =   P
s=2Gf
(ps   ws   cs)ss(epfr(s)) (because ss(epfr(s)) = 0 if s 2 Gf ) is the part
corresponding to the "endogenous" rent that the manufacturer has to leave to the retailer.
It is clear from this expression that the "endogenous rent" that the manufacturer leaves to the
retailer is not a¤ected by the retail prices on its own products decided using RPM because the
vector epfr(s) corresponds to the vector of prices when rm f products are not sold by retailer r
and thus is not a¤ected by retails prices of rm f products.
Now, we can use the rst order conditions of the maximization of prot of f with respect to
retail prices pj 2 Gf using the simpler expression of prot with no endogenous buyer power since
rst order conditions are equivalent (as in Bonnet and Dubois, 2010) :
0 = sj(p) +
JX
s=1

(ps   ws   cs)@ss(p)
@pj

+
X
s2Gf
(ws   s)
@ss(p)
@pj
As Rey and Vergé (2004) argue, a continuum of equilibria exist in this general case with RPM,
with one equilibrium corresponding to each possible value of the vector of wholesale prices w.
As we can re-write the retail margins (p   w   c) as the di¤erence between total margins
(p   c) and wholesale margins (w ), the previous J J 0 rst order conditions can be written
in a matrix form as
IfSp( +  ) + Ifs(p)  IfSp(I   If )  = 0 (12)
where   = (ws   s)s=1;::;J is the full vector of wholesale margins and  +   the vector of total
margins.
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The previous equations stand for the pricing of brands owned by manufacturers who retail their
products through a downstream intermediary. Private labels (store brands) pricing obviously does
not follow the same pricing equilibrium. However the retailersprots coming from private labels
are implicitly taken into account in the incentive and participation constraints of retailers when
manufacturers make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. Taking into account the possibility of endogenous
entry and exit of private label products by retailers is out of the scope of this paper.
Thus, in the case of private label products, retailers (who are also "manufacturers") choose
retail prices and bear the marginal cost of production and distribution, solving :
max
fpjgj2 eSr
X
s2eSr (ps   s   cs)ss(p) +
X
s2SrneSr (ps   ws   cs)ss(p)
where eSr is the set of private label products of retailer r. Thus, for private label products, additional
equations are obtained from the rst order conditions of the prot maximization of retailers that
both produce and retail these products. The rst order conditions give
X
s2eSr
(ps   s   cs)
@ss(p)
@pj
+ sj(p) +
X
s2SrneSr
(ps   ws   cs)@ss(p)
@pj
= 0 for all j 2 eSr
which can be written
X
s2Sr
(ps   s   cs)
@ss(p)
@pj
+ sj(p) 
X
s2SrneSr
(ws   s)
@ss(p)
@pj
= 0 for all j 2 eSr
In matrix notation, these rst order conditions are : for r = 1; ::; R
(eIrSpIr)( +  ) + eIrs(p)  eIrSpIr  = 0 (13)
where eIr is the ownership matrix of private label products by retailer r.
We thus obtain a system of equations with (12) and (13) where  +   and   are unknown,
which is the following :
IfSp( +  ) + Ifs(p)  IfSp(I   If )  = 0 for f = 1; ::; F
(eIrSpIr)( +  ) + eIrs(p)  eIrSpIr  = 0 for r = 1; ::; R
After solving the system (see appendix 7.1), we obtain the expression for the total price-cost margin
of all products as a function of demand parameters, of the structure of the industry and the vector
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  of wholesale prices :
 +   =  
X
r
IrS
0
p
eIrSpIr +X
f
S0pIfSp
 1
X
r
IrS
0
p
eIr [s(p)  SpIr ] +X
f
S0pIf [s(p)  Sp(I   If ) ]

(14)
With RPM, there is a continuum of equilibria depending on the vector of wholesale prices w. We
will see in section 4.2 that further assumptions or restrictions can help characterize and identify
some of these equilibria from observed data.
3.2.2 Without Resale Price Maintenance
We now present the case where where manufacturers cannot apply RPM. Then, whether retai-
lers have endogenous buyer power or not makes a di¤erence on the equilibrium retail prices.
In absence of RPM, the retailers prices epfr(w) are out of equilibrium prices di¤erent from the
retail prices in equilibrium. The rst order conditions of the maximization of the prot of f (11)
with respect to wholesale prices wj , j 2 Gf , are then :
0 =
JX
i=1
X
s2Gf
(ws   s)
@ss(p)
@pi
@pi
@wj
+
JX
s=1
"
@ps
@wj
ss(p)  @epfr(s)s
@wj
ss(epfr(s))#
+
JX
i=1
JX
s=1

(ps   ws   cs) @ss(p)
@pi
@pi
@wj
 
epfr(s)s   ws   cs @ss(epfr(s))@pi @pi@wj

In matrix notation, the previous rst order conditions give
0 = IfPwSpIf f + IfPws(p)  If ~P fws(epf ) + IfPwSp   IfPwSfep ef
where the matrix Sfep is
Sfep 
0BB@
@s1(epfr(1))
@p1
:: @sJ (epfr(J))@p1
...
...
@s1(epfr(1))
@pJ
:: @sJ (epfr(J))@pJ
1CCA
and ~P fw is the matrix of rst order derivatives of retail prices epfr(j)j (w) (for j = 1; ::; J) with respect
to wholesale prices w.
Thus the wholesale margins of products of manufacturer f are
 f =   [IfPwSpIf ] 1

IfPws(p)  If ~P fws(epf ) + IfPwSp   IfPwSfep ef (15)
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where  comes from (2) and ef = (ef1 ; ::; efJ) where efs is the sth element of vector (Ir(s)Sfep Ir(s)) 1Ir(s)s(epf ).
Remark that out of equilibrium retail prices can be obtained from observed equilibrium retail
prices, retail margins at equilibrium and out of equilibrium retail margins using : epfr(s)s = efr(s)s  
(ps   ws   cs)+ps where efr(s)s = epfr(s)s  ws cs is the out of equilibrium retail margin. Moreover,
~P fw can be deduced from the di¤erentiation of the retailers rst order conditions with respect to
wholesale prices. These rst order conditions are, for all r = 1; ::; R and 8j 2 Sr,
sj(epfr) + X
s2SrnGfr
(epfrs   ws   cs)@ss(~pfr)
@~pfrj
= 0
which gives for r = 1; ::; R, j 2 Sr and s = 1; ::; J 0
0 =
X
l2f1;::;JgnGfr
@sj(epfr(j))
@epfr(j)l
@epfr(j)l
@ws
  1fs2Srg
@ss(epfr(j))
@epfr(j)j +
X
l2Sr
@sl(epfr(j))
@epfr(j)j
@epfr(j)l
@ws
+
X
l2SrnGfr
24(epfrl   wl   cl) X
s2f1;::;JgnGfr
@2sl(epfr(j))
@epfr(j)j @epfr(j)s
@epfr(j)s
@ws
35 (16)
Dening Spj
~pf
the matrix (J  J) of the second derivatives of the market shares with respect to
retail prices whose element (s; l) is @
2sl(epfr(j))
@epfr(j)j @epfr(j)s , i.e.
S
pj
~pf

0BBBB@
@2s1(epfr(j))
@epfr(j)j @epfr(j)1 : : : @
2sJ (epfr(j))
@epfr(j)j @epfr(j)1
... :
...
@2s1(epfr(j))
@epfr(j)j @epfr(j)J : : : @
2sJ (epfr(j))
@epfr(j)j @epfr(j)J
1CCCCA ;
we can write equation (16) in matrix form to obtain
~P fw
h
Sfep + IrSf 0ep + (Sp1~pf Irefrj:::jSpJ~pf Irefr)i Ir   IrSfep Ir   eIr = 0
where efr = epfr   w   c.
Denoting Mfr the matrix
h
Sfep + IrSf 0ep + (Sp1~pf Irefrj:::jSpJ~pf Irefr)i we can solve this system of
equations and get the following expression for ~P fw
~P fw =  
XR
r=1
IrM
0
frIrS
fep (Ir   eIr)XRr=1 IrM 0frMfrIr
 1
Equation (15) shows that one can express the manufacturers price-cost margins vector as depen-
ding on the demand function and the structure of the industry by replacing the expression for
~P fw.
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When retailers have no endogenous buyer power :
If retailers have no endogenous buyer power, we can suppress the constraints (10) and take
only into account the constraints (9). Then, as shown in appendix 7.2, the manufacturers prot
maximization is equivalent to set wholesale prices in the following program
max
fwsg2Gf
X
s2Gf
(ps   s   cs)ss(p) +
X
s62Gf
(ps   ws   cs)ss(p)
The rst order conditions are : for all i 2 Gf ,
X
s
@ps
@wi
ss(p) +
X
s2Gf
24(ps   s   cs)X
j
@ss
@pj
@pj
@wi
35+ X
s62Gf
24(ps   ws   cs)X
j
@ss
@pj
@pj
@wi
35 = 0
which gives in matrix notation
IfPws(p) + IfPwSpIf (p    c) + IfPwSp (I   If ) (p  w   c) = 0
This implies that the total price-cost margin is such that for all f = 1; ::; F;
f +  f = (IfPwSpIf )
 1
[ IfPws(p)  IfPwSp (I   If ) (p  w   c)] : (17)
Using (2) to replace (p  w   c) and (6) for Pw, this allows us to estimate the price-cost margins
with demand parameters. Remark again that the formula (2) provides directly the total price-cost
margin obtained by each retailer on its private label.
4 Identication and Econometric Method
4.1 A Random Coe¢ cients Logit Demand Model
The estimation of price-cost margins under the di¤erent models previously considered requires
the observation of the market structure and of the demand shape. As in Villas-Boas (2007) or
Bonnet and Dubois (2010), we use the demand and structural equation to infer margins. A careful
demand estimation is thus important. The market demand is derived using a standard discrete
choice model of consumer behavior that follows the work of Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes (1995) and estimated on individual choices as in Revelt and Train (1998). We use a random-
coe¢ cients logit model which is a very exible general model (McFadden and Train, 2000). Contrary
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to the standard logit model, the random-coe¢ cients logit model imposes very few restrictions on
the demand own and cross-price elasticities. This exibility makes it the most appropriate model
to get consistent estimates of the demand parameters required in the computation of the price-cost
margins.
As in Bonnet and Dubois (2010), we use a random coe¢ cient logit model but allow a more
exible specication of random utility with more heterogeneity of preferences and estimate the
demand on individual purchase choices instead of aggregate data (we also use more recent data
using the year 2006 instead of 1998-2000).
The basic specication of the direct utility function of a consumer i buying product j at t is
Uijt = b(j) + r(j) + iXj   ipjt + "ijt (18)
where b(j) represents a brand specic e¤ect on utility capturing time invariant brand characteris-
tics, r(j) represents a retailer specic e¤ect capturing time invariant retailer characteristics, Xj is
a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the product j is a mineral water and 0 otherwise, pjt is the
price of product j at period t, and "ijt is a separable additive random shock to utility. The random
coe¢ cient i represents the unobserved marginal disutility of price for consumer i. We assume
that i = + vi where v

i is an unobserved consumer characteristic and 
 characterizes how
consumer marginal disutility of price deviates form the mean disutility of price  with this unob-
served characteristic. We also assume that consumers have di¤erent tastes for the mineral water
versus spring water characteristic. Hence, we write i =  + vi where v

i represents unobserved
consumer characteristic and  the mean taste for that product characteristic.
The model is completed by the inclusion of an outside good, denoted good zero, allowing
consumer i not to buy one of the J marketed products. The mean utility of the outside good
is normalized to zero implying that the consumer indirect utility of choosing the outside good is
Ui0t = "i0t.
Then, doing the usual parametric assumption on "ijt would allow to write a closed form solution
for the probability for a consumer i to buy a product j at a given period. However, more than the
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parametric assumption required to obtain a logit form conditional probability, it requires that "ijt
be uncorrelated with price and thus that no unobserved heterogeneity of products be correlated
with consumer tastes and with price. As some product characteristics might be omitted in the
specication of utility (18), like for instance, product advertising, and be correlated with the prices
of products, Petrin and Train (2010) propose a control function approach to solve this endogeneity
problem of prices. This method consists in estimating a rst stage regression of prices on observed
cost shifters as follows :
pjt = b(j) + r(j) + Wjt + jt
where b(j) and r(j) are brand specic and retailer specic e¤ects and Wjt represents a vector of
cost shifters like input prices and jt is a random shock dened as the residual of the orthogonal
projection of pjt on b(j), r(j), Wjt. Then, introducing the estimated term bjt in the specication
of the consumer utility Uijt makes the assumption of orthogonality of the residual consumer utility
deviations (denoted uijt) with price more plausible. This method amounts to assume that the
consumer utility can be written as follows : Uijt = b(j) + r(j) + iXj   ipjt + bjt + uijt where
by denition uijt = "ijt  bjt with the maintained assumption that uijt is orthogonal to pjt. With
this random utility, we assume that consumer i chooses alternative j(i; t) if Uij(i;t)t  Uijt for all
j = 1; ::; J and Uij(i;t)t > Uijt for some j.
This method allows to estimate consistently the demand price elasticities even if time varying
unobserved characteristics (correlated with bjt) a¤ect consumer tastes and are correlated with
price (like advertising), provided that the residual or the projection of these unobservables on
bjt be uncorrelated with the price pjt. Remark that such specication also implies that policy
simulations have to be taken cautiously. Actually, the endogenous determination of this unobserved
heterogeneity is not modelled and is thus unknown under possible counterfactual situations to be
simulated (for example like a merger), unless we maintain that this unobserved heterogeneity does
not change in the counterfactual situation.
Then, instead of making a parametric assumption on "ijt, we assume that the idiosyncratic
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taste shocks uijt are independently and identically distributed according to a Gumbel (extreme
value type 1) distribution, so that the probability Lijt of buying j for consumer i at period t
conditional on i and i can be written :
Lijt(i; i) =
exp(Vijt)
1 +
PJ
k=1 exp(Vikt)
where Vijt = b(j) + r(j) + iXj   ipjt + bjt.
For simplicity, we assume that
 
vi ; v

i

are independent and normalalize their variance to
one and mean to zero. Denoting f the standard normal probability distribution function, the
unconditional probability of the observed sequence of T choices for consumer i is then
Pi(; 
; ; ; ) =
Z YT
t=1
Lij(i;t)t(i; i)

f(ij; )f(ij; )didi:
where  is the vector of all b and r parameters in (18), j(i; t) is the chosen alternative by
consumer i at period t and f(ij; ) and f(ij; ) are the p.d.f. of the random coe¢ cients i
and i respectively.
Then, the log likelihood of the sample of choices over N individuals is :
XN
i=1
ln

Pi(; 
; ; ; )

:
The probability of the observed sequence of choice for consumer i is approximated with simulation
for any given value of
 
; ; ; ; 

and can be written :
SPi(; 
; ; ; ) =
1
R
XR
r=1
YT
t=1
Lij(i;t)t(
r; r)

where R is the number of simulations, r and r are the rth Halton draws of the distributions
f(ij; ) and f(ij; ) respectively.
Then, the model parameters are estimated by maximizing the simulated likelihood (Train, 2009)
which is
SLL(; ; ; ; ) =
XN
i=1
ln

SPi(; 
; ; ; )

with respect to ; ; ; ; .
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The random-coe¢ cients logit model generates a exible pattern of substitutions between pro-
ducts. Consumers have di¤erent price disutilities that will be averaged to a mean price sensitivity
and cross-price elasticities are not constrained by the individual level logit assumption. Once the
individual demand parameters have been estimated, the aggregate market shares and price elas-
ticities of the demand can be recomputed by simulation in order to be used for the estimation of
price-cost margins using the di¤erent supply models presented in section 3. Expressions for own
and cross-price elasticities are given in Appendix 7.4.
4.2 Identication and Tests Across Supply Models
Lets consider in this section the problem of identication of retail or wholesale margins and
test across the di¤erent supply models with a known demand function and market shares and
observed retail prices for a set of T markets. Remark that from the conditions obtained before for
the price equilibrium in case of two part tari¤s contracts, the identication of xed fees is never
possible and thus only "variable" margins (as opposed to margins obtained from xed fees) and
marginal costs can possibly be identied. Prots of retailers and manufacturers are not identied
up to a constant exogenous to the horizontal and vertical competition modelled here.
The di¤erent supply models of section 3 give di¤erent restrictions on the supply side and in
particular on wholesale and retail price-cost margin vectors denoted   and  respectively. Depen-
ding on the model, the implied restrictions do not lead to the same degree of identication or
underidentication of price-cost margins.
4.2.1 Linear pricing models :
In the case of linear pricing between manufacturers and retailers, both manufacturer level and
retailer level price-cost margins are straightforwardly identied with (2) and (4).
4.2.2 Two-Part Tari¤ s contracts without RPM
In the case of two part tari¤s contracts without RPM between manufacturers and retailers, we
have seen in section 3.2.2 that both the manufacturer level and retailer level price-cost margins are
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identied, whether there is endogenous buyer power or not.
4.2.3 Two-Part Tari¤ s contracts with RPM
In the case of two part tari¤s contracts with RPM, multiple equilibria prevent the full identica-
tion of price-cost margins without further restriction. Actually, given that we have J products and
T markets, we have potentially JT marginal costs of distribution and JT marginal costs of pro-
duction, or equivalently JT retailer margins and JT manufacturer margins, to identify. Identifying
the JT retailer level and JT manufacturer level price-cost margins implies that 2JT parameters
have to be identied while our structural model generally gives a system of JT equations. These
equations can be written as equations linking the vector of total margins ( t + t), for market
(period) t, as a function of the vector of wholesale margins ( t) of the form
( t + t) = H( t)
where H(:) is the known function (14) depending on the demand shape and the structure of the
industry in terms of products ownership at the retailing and manufacturing levels.
As retail prices and the correspondenceH(:) are known, there exists a one to one correspondence
between the vector of unknown JT parameters  jt and the vector of unknown JT total marginal
costs denoted Cjt because
Cjt = jt + cjt = pjt  
 
 jt + jt

= pjt  Hj( t) for all j = 1; ::; J and t = 1; ::; T
where Hj denotes the jth row of H.
The degree of underidentication is thus at most equal to the dimension of the vectors of
wholesale prices (or wholesale margins  t), that is JT . Then, identication cannot be obtained
unless additional restrictions are imposed.
We consider several possible restrictions, from very strong ones (the ones considered in Bonnet
and Dubois, 2010) imposing zero wholesale or retail margins to a general case with a less restrictive
one.
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Zero wholesale margins : Fixing the vector of wholesale margins  t to zero is su¢ cient to
get identication of total margins and thus also retail and wholesale margins which are zero in this
case. This
This corresponds to the particular equilibrium where wholesale prices are such that wst = st
for all s, t that is  t = 0, 8t. Simplifying (14), it implies that
t =  
X
r
IrS
0
p
eIrSpIr +X
f
S0pIfSp
 1 X
r
IrS
0
p
eIr +X
f
S0pIf

s(pt) (19)
Remark that in the absence of private label products, this expression would simplify to the case
where the total prots of the integrated industry are maximized, that is
t =  S 1p s(pt) (20)
because then
P
f If = I and eIr = 0.
This shows that two part tari¤s contracts with RPM allow to maximize the full prots of the
integrated industry if retailers have no private label products, the buyer power of retailers shifting
simply the rent between parties. Rey and Vergé (2004) showed that, among the continuum of
possible equilibria, the case where wholesale prices are equal to the marginal costs of production
is the equilibrium that would be selected if retailers can provide a retailing e¤ort that increases
demand. In this case, if the manufacturer allows the retailer to be the residual claimant of his
retailing e¤ort, it leads to select wholesale prices equal to marginal costs of production.
Zero retail margins : When wholesale prices are such that the retailers price-cost margins
are zero (pst(w

st) wst   cst = 0 that is ft = 0 for all f), then the rst order conditions give the
simplied expression of wholesale margins as
 ft = (pt   t   ct) =  (IfSpIf ) 1Ifs(pt) (21)
for all f = 1; ::; F . For private label products, denoting plrt +  
pl
rt the vector of total price-cost
margins of private labels of retailer r, we have
plrt +  
pl
rt =  (eIrSp eIr) 1 eIrs(pt)
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All margins are then identied.
General case : A less restrictive identication method may consist in adding restrictions on
the vectors of marginal costs and margins. Actually, the total marginal cost Cjt of product j being
the sum of the marginal cost of production jt and of distribution cjt, we will consider the following
assumption to get identication of retail and wholesale margins in two-part tari¤s models :
Identication assumption :
Cjt = jt + cjt = f(b(j) + r(j))pjt for all j = 1; ::; J and t = 1; ::; T (22)
where b(j) denotes the brand of product j, r(j) the retailer of product j, and f(:) is a function to
be specied.
This assumption means that total marginal cost Cjt is a positive share of retail price pjt
which is non time varying, brand and retailer specic. It introduces some restrictions between the
J  T unknown marginal costs Cjt and the (B + R)  T unknown parameters b and r (where
B+R < J = BR and B is the number of brands and R the number of retailers). In practice, we
impose f(x) = 11+exp(x) which proved to be the preferred specication among several tested ones
in terms of tractability of empirical estimation.
Then, this identication assumption implies that
pjt  Hj( t) = f(b(j) + r(j))pjt for all j = 1; ::; J and t = 1; ::; T
which reduces the degree of underidentication since it adds J  T restrictions and only (B +
R) additional unknown parameters. The true degree of underidentication will depend on the
properties of the non linear function H(:).
The identication of margins will thus depend on the set Sh of vectors of wholesale margins
  = ( 1; ::; T ) solutions to the identication restrictions (22). This set can be described as the set
Sh dened by
Sh =

  2 RJT j hjt( ) = 0;8j;8t
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with hjt( t) = pjt  Hj( t)  f(^b(j) ( t) + ^r(j) ( t))pjt where the parameters
n
^b ( t) ; ^r ( t)
o
are solutions to the following minimization problem
min
fb;rgb=1;::;B;r=1;::;R
X
j;t

pjt  Hj( t)  f(b(j) + r(j))pjt
2
Writing the identication problem in this way allows to more simply nd a lower bound on the
degree of underidentication. Indeed, it could be that Sh is not an empty set for many di¤erent
vectors of fb;rgb=1;::;B;r=1;::;R and not only the one that minimize the criterion above. However,
in practice, this will not happen in our empirical application and we prefer to present here this
weaker result which is su¢ cient to explain our method.
Thus, the degree of underidentication of the supply model depends on card(Sh). The vector
of margins is underidentied if card(Sh) > 1, and overidentied if Sh = ?. As remarked above,
the case of just-identication does not necessarily correspond to card(Sh) = 1,because Sh dened
as above is a lower bound of the "identication set".
In practice, we will see that the demand shape is such that we always get overidentication and
we will consider the solution
  = f t gt=1;::;T = arg minf tgt=1;::;T
Xt=1;::;T
j=1;::;J
hjt( t)
2 (23)
as the equilibrium solution.
4.2.4 Testing across di¤ erent models
Then, in order to test between alternative models once we have estimated the demand model
and obtained the di¤erent price-cost margins estimates according to their expressions obtained in
section 3, we apply non nested tests à la Vuong (1989) exactly as in Bonnet and Dubois (2010).
The tests allow to draw some inference between any two alternative models for which we obtained
total marginal costs. The tests statistics are based on the di¤erence between lack-of-t criterion
of each cost equation that can be estimated for each model once price-cost margins are obtained.
Details on the specication of these cost equations will be given in the next section.
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5 Econometric Estimation and Test Results
5.1 Demand Estimation Results
Using the data described in section 2.2, we have constructed observations of the households
choices of bottles of water over 13 periods of 4 weeks in 2006 using each purchase and an arbi-
trary rule consisting in assuming that the household product is the one purchased in the largest
quantity during each period. Doing such aggregation is however not essential for the results found.
Using other time periods or drawing at random a purchase event for each period did not change
signicantly the results. The household purchase data nally allows to construct a sample of 2
836 households present over the whole 13 periods that is 36 868 observations. We have removed
households not present in the survey for some periods in 2006 in order to obtain a balancer panel
data set and also removed observations for which missing values exist in some variables. On this
sample, we estimated the demand model presented in section 4, as well as a standard multinomial
logit model. The estimates6 of the random-coe¢ cients logit model and the simple multinomial logit
are in Table 2.
Multinomial Random Coe¢ cients
Coe¢ cients Logit Logit
(Std. error) (1) (2)
Price ( ) -18.76 (0.003) -20.33 (0.004)
Price () 6.42 (0.002)
Mineral water () 1.28 (0.001) 3.48 (0.001)
Mineral water () 3.83 (0.001)
Control bjt () 17.06 (0.004) 15.85 (0.005)
Brand 1 3.00 (0.007) 3.20 (0.001)
Brand 2 5.08 (0.001) 5.48 (0.001)
Brand 3 1.86 (0.001) 1.99 (0.001)
Brand 4 0.97 (0.001) 1.28 (0.001)
Brand 5 2.25 (0.001) 2.81 (0.001)
Brand 6 0.88 (0.000) 0.69 (0.001)
Retailer 1 0.15 (0.000) 0.36 (0.000)
Retailer 2 0.69 (0.000) 0.92 (0.000)
Retailer 3 0.02 (0.001) 0.25 (0.001)
Retailer 4 0.45 (0.000) 0.62 (0.000)
Retailer 5 0.90 (0.000) 0.11 (0.000)
Retailer 6 -0.17 (0.001) 0.03 (0.001)
Table 2 : Estimation Results of Demand Models
6Remark that we cannot provide the names of brand and retailer chains because of a condentiality agreement
with TNS World Panel who provided us the data.
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The results show that the price coe¢ cient has the correct sign. In the case of the random
coe¢ cient logit model, the price coe¢ cient has a distribution with mean equal to 20.33 and standard
deviation  equal to 6.42 which means that only 0.07% of the distribution of the coe¢ cient i
has the wrong sign. The mean taste of the mineral characteristic is positive which means that
consumers like mineral waters. Only 17.6% do not like it. In the multinomial or random coe¢ cient
logit model, the parameter  of the control term bjt (obtained from a rst stage price regression
shown in appendix 7.3) is signicantly positive showing that, on one hand, some correlation existed
between prices and unobserved product characteristics included in the error term "ijt and these
unobserved characteristics would enter positively in the utility function. We would expect that
product advertising increases the consumer utility and is also positively correlated with price,
giving an interpretation to this control function approach as in Petrin and Train (2010).
Finally, once we obtained our structural demand estimates, we can compute price elasticities of
demand for these di¤erentiated products. Table 3 presents the di¤erent average elasticities obtained
with the estimates of the random-coe¢ cients logit model. Although the data are more recent and
the demand model more exible and estimated on individual data, we obtain that mineral waters
are more sensitive to price variation than spring waters as in Bonnet and Dubois (2010).
Average Own-price Elasticities (Ejk)
Mean (Std. Dev.)
All -5.80 (1.68)
Mineral water -6.70 (0.63)
Spring water -3.09 (0.63)
Table 3 : Estimated Elasticities under Random Coe¢ cients Logit
5.2 Estimation of Price-Cost Margins and Non Nested Tests
Once one has estimated the demand parameters, we can use the formulas obtained in section 3
to compute the price-cost margins at the retailer and manufacturer levels, for all products, under
the various classes of models considered. Under some models, wholesale, retail or total margins are
not identied without additional restrictions that we will thus impose. Empirically, we are able to
solve the minimization problem (23) using the additional restriction (22).
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We present the estimation results of several models that seem worth of consideration with
some variants on the behavior of manufacturers or retailers. Table 4 then shows the averages of
the estimates of product level price-cost margins under the di¤erent models considered7 . Price-
cost margins are lower for mineral water than for spring water in percentage of retail price but
are larger in absolute value. Model 1 concerns the case of linear pricing. In order to save space,
variants of linear pricing models with di¤erent interaction between manufacturers and retailers are
not presented although they have been estimated. As in Sudhir (2001), we estimated variants of
the linear pricing model by assuming collusion between manufacturers and/or retailers or assuming
that retailers act as pass-through agents of marginal cost of production. All these models are nally
strongly rejected (as in Bonnet and Dubois, 2010, for older data) and thus not shown. We also
consider several non linear contracting models with exogenous or endogenous buyer power. Models
2, 3, 4 and 5 correspond to two part tari¤s contracts with resale price maintenance. Remind that,
in this case, whether the retailers can use competing o¤ers to increase their buyer power when
dealing with manufacturers does not change the pricing equilibrium but only the unobserved and
unidentied xed fees which determine the sharing of the rent in the vertical structure. Thus,
these estimation results are consistent with a model where either the buyer power is endogenous
or exogenous in the vertical relationship. Model 2 is the general case (14) where the equilibrium
wholesale margins are estimated using an additional restriction (22) on total margins across pro-
ducts and markets as described in 4.2. Model 3 corresponds to the case where no wholesale price
discrimination is imposed. In this model, manufacturers are prevented to sell a given product to
di¤erent retailers at di¤erent prices which implies that the wholesale price of any product j depends
only on its brand b(j) and not on the retailers identity r(j). These restrictions are incorporated
in the estimation of margins using the same method as in (23) where the vector of unknowns  
is constrained to uniform wholesale pricing. The results of the estimation of models 2 and 3 show
7Note that the average price-cost margin at the retailer level plus the average price-cost margin at the manufac-
turer level do not sum to the total price cost margin because of the private labels products for which no price cost
margin at the manufacturer level is computed, the retailer price cost margin being then equal to the total price cost
margin.
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retail, wholesale and total margins obtained from this estimation (remind that for private labels
total margins are equal to retail margin by convention and thus on average total margins are lower
than the sum of average retail and wholesale margins). In Model 4, we assume that wholesale prices
are equal to the marginal cost of production. It corresponds to the case of equation (19). Model 5
is the case where the wholesale prices are such that the retailersmargins are zero. Finally, models
6 and 7 are the case of two part tari¤s contracts without resale price maintenance either without
endogenous buyer power (model 6) or with endogenous buyer power (model 7).
Price-Cost Margins (% of retail price pjt) Mineral Water Spring Water
Mean Std. Mean Std.
Linear Pricing (Double Marginalization)
Model 1 Retailers 17.04 2.24 36.26 7.14
Manufacturers 23.02 3.77 43.72 6.16
Total 36.23 8.17 58.12 27.43
Two part Tari¤s with RPM
Model 2 General wholesale prices (wjt) with restriction (22)
Retailers 33.82 23.44 30.45 35.95
Manufacturers 12.44 25.77 57.14 49.76
Total 44.19 11.13 59.03 27.64
Model 3 No wholesale price discrimination (wb(j)t) with restriction (22)
Retailers 28.15 33.74 22.05 26.16
Manufacturers 21.13 33.61 75.13 33.61
Total 45.76 12.04 59.62 28.49
Model 4 Manufacturer marginal cost pricing (w = ) 66.05 19.27 77.14 40.82
Model 5 Zero retail margin (p = w + c) 25.70 4.96 44.03 15.35
Two-part Tari¤s without RPM
Exogenous Retail Buyer Power
Model 6 Retailers 17.04 2.24 36.26 7.14
Manufacturers 19.22 3.96 26.65 4.23
Total 33.06 6.77 49.58 18.75
Endogenous Retail Buyer Power
Model 7 Retailers 17.04 2.24 36.26 7.14
Manufacturers 22.66 5.50 54.10 7.32
Total 35.93 8.47 63.31 32.60
Table 4 : Estimation Results of Price-Cost Margins (averages by groups)
After estimating the di¤erent price-cost margins for the models considered, one can recover the
total marginal cost Chjt and then estimate cost equations allowing to implement the non nested tests
across the di¤erent models. For such tests, we specify cost equations as follows, for h = 1; :::; 7 :
lnChjt = !
h
b(j) + !
h
r(j) +Wjtg + ln 
h
jt
30
where variables Wjt include wages, diesel oil, and plastic price variables and !hb , !
h
r are brand and
retailer specic e¤ects. Actually, it is likely that labor cost, plastic price (which is the major com-
ponent of bottles and packaging) and oil prices (which a¤ect transportation costs) are important
determinants of variable costs. Also, the relatively important variations of all these price indices
over time suggests a potentially good identication of our cost equations. Table 5 presents the
results of these cost equations estimated by OLS for the 7 di¤erent models.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Wage 2.09 -1.02 -1.90 -4.48 3.02 1.90 2.07
(Std. err.) (0.72) (0.73) (0.75) (0.75) (0.78) (0.74) (0.64)
Plastic 0.03 2.77 3.95 5.10 -0.48 0.25 0.04
(Std. err.) (0.69) (0.70) (0.72) (0.72) (0.74) (0.70) (0.64)
Diesel oil 0.58 0.12 -0.18 -0.09 0.71 0.64 0.63
(Std. err.) (0.33) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.34) (0.30)
!hb ; !
h
r not shown
F test

!hb = 0
	
796.57 646.20 554.26 471.66 872.82 773.86 962.38
(p val.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
F test

!hr = 0
	
10.32 6.44 7.21 8.43 6.36 3.00 6.69
(p val.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Table 5 : Cost Equations for the Random Coe¢ cients Logit Model
These cost equations are useful mostly in order to test which model ts best the data. We thus
performed the non nested test of Rivers and Vuong (2002) which gives the same inference as the
Vuong (1989) test. Results of the tests are provided in Table 6. Each matrix element gives the test
statistic of testing the hypothesis H1 in column in favor of the hypothesis H2 in row. When the
test statistic is negative and below the critical value chosen (-1.64 for a 5% test), it means that
we reject H1 in favor of H2. When the test statistic is positive and above the critical value chosen
(1.64 for a 5% test), it means that we reject H2 in favor of H1. When the test statistic is between
the two critical values (-1.64,1.64), it means that we cannot distinguish statistically H1 from H2.
Tn ! N(0; 1)
 H2
H1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 0.86 2.39 2.21 3.68 1.22 -2.54
2 3.00 3.57 4.33 0.05 -2.10
3 0.36 2.50 -0.99 -2.66
4 1.68 -1.11 -2.68
5 -2.05 -3.02
6 -2.76
Table 6 : Non Nested Tests Across Models
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The statistics of test Tn show that the best model appears to be the model 7. Thus, our empirical
evidence shows that, on this market of bottled water, manufacturers and retailers use two part
tari¤s contracts without resale price maintenance (RPM) and this model also indicates that the
buyer power of retailers is a¤ected endogenously by their outside opportunities.
Concerning this inference on the vertical relationship, other variants tested were also rejected.
For example, all the variants of two part tari¤s contracts without RPM where uniform wholesale
pricing is imposed were also rejected, as well as models of collusion between manufacturers or
between retailers.
Lets comment more on the preferred model. This is a model with two part tari¤ contract, and
no RPM, which contrasts with what was found in Bonnet and Dubois (2010) on the 1998-2000
period where RPM was found. It is interesting because in 2005, the Galland act was removed and
replaced by another law in order to redene resale at loss by retailers and prevent the use of high
list wholesale prices to implement RPM. Actually, RPM is in principle forbidden in France but
the evidence found in Bonnet and Dubois (2010) was consistent with the worries of the compe-
tition authority that the Galland act (in force between 1996 and 2005) allowed manufacturers to
implement RPM equilibrium. Indeed, the denition of thresholds for resale at loss did not take
into account backward margins and only wholesale unitary list prices which could be set as high
as wanted to enforce minimum retail prices, while compensating retailers with backward margins.
After 2005, this became impossible because the denition of minimum retail prices to dene resale
at loss did include part of the backward margins. It seems that the change in the law did succeed
in avoiding manufacturers to mimic RPM.
Also, for this preferred model, Table 4 shows that the average price-cost margins are of 35.9%
for mineral water and 63.3% for spring water. In absolute values, the price-cost margins are on
average 0.13e for mineral water and 0.09e for spring water because mineral water is on average
more expensive. For this best model, the average total price-cost margins for national brands is
48.2% while it is of 26.4% for private labels. Remark that the high average margin for national
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brands is largely due to the only spring water national brand for which the total margin is much
larger than others8 . Otherwise, national brands mineral water have an average total margin of
39.05% with 16.39% for the retail margin and 22.66% for the wholesale margin.
Comparing models 6 and 7, it seems that the fact that the retail buyer power of retailers is
endogenous, meaning that retailers can use the competing o¤ers of manufacturers in the contracting
decision with a given manufacturer, raises the total margin compared to the case where the retailer
buyer power is exogenous. Indeed, wholesale margins are larger with endogenous buyer power
because manufacturers have to leave some additional "endogenous" rent to retailers through the use
of xed fees that we can interpret as backward margins for retailers. Manufacturersreaction seems
thus to back up into higher wholesale prices the buyers capacity to recover backward margins.
By di¤erence between models 6 and 7, we can see that on average these additional backward
margins represent 3.44% of retail price for mineral water and 18.32% for spring water. Industry
structure is thus very important for determining margins. Taking into account the endogeneity
of retailers buyer power in the vertical relationships and price-setting games is crucial for the
consistent evaluation of markups. The horizontal competition between manufacturers of bottles
of water allows retailers to obtain additional "endogenous" backward margins which raise the
wholesale prices o¤ered by manufacturers.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the rst empirical estimation of a structural model taking into ac-
count explicitly the endogenous buyer power of downstream retailers in two part tari¤s contracts
between manufacturers and retailers. We show how to estimate di¤erent structural models embed-
ding the strategic relationships of upstream and downstream players, using demand estimates and
the industry structure. We consider several alternative models of competition between manufac-
turers and retailers on a di¤erentiated product market and test between these alternatives. We
8There is a unique spring water national brand on the market for which total margins are relatively large. This
spring water comes from many springs located in di¤erent places in the country and is known to have thus low
transportation costs, and to use low quality low price packaging.
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study in particular several types of non linear pricing relationships with two part tari¤s contracts
allowing retailers to enjoy some endogenous buyer power, and where RPM may be used or not.
The method is implemented on the market for bottles of water in France in 2006 and estimates of
demand parameters using micro-data allow us to recover price-cost margins at the manufacturer
and retailer levels for di¤erent models. We then test between the di¤erent models. Our empirical
evidence allows to conclude that manufacturers and retailers use two part tari¤s contracts without
RPM and that the buyer power of retailers is endogenously determined by the upstream horizontal
competition between manufacturers. The buyer power of retailers is thus a¤ected endogenously by
their o¤ers from other manufacturers. Remark that the endogeneity of the buyer power of retailers
that we take into account does not come from the retailers production of private labels but only
from their strategic role in retailing and the competing manufacturers making also o¤ers. With a
di¤erent modelling, Meza and Sudhir (2009) study how private labels a¤ect the bargaining power
of retailers. In the present paper, the set of brands and products is taken as given including private
labels. Endogenizing entry of private labels is more complicated and out of the scope of this paper.
Finally, remark that the contracts considered here between manufacturers and retailers are
"bundling" contracts where manufacturers make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to retailers for their mul-
tiple products. Considering unbundled contracts is also possible in our methodology even if more
demanding in terms of estimation. However, this alternative model is likely to reinforce the buyer
power of retailers, allowed to accept part of the brands of a manufacturer instead of the whole
bundle, a situation which would thus go even more in the direction found and the evidence that re-
tailers enjoy additional buyer power in front of their upstream competing providers. Endogenizing
the bundles of goods o¤ered to retailers as well a the possible foreclosure e¤ects in this industry is
thus an interesting research direction (Rey and Stigliz, 1995, Rey and Tirole, 2007). The markets
for bottles of water in France does not seem to be importantly a¤ected by such strategies but other
markets are (Asker, 2005) and further work needs to be done in this direction.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Detailed resolution of system of equations
Generically we have systems of equations to be solved of the form
Af ( +  ) +Bf = 0
for f = 1; ::; G
where Af and Bf are some given matrices.
Solving this system amounts to solve the following minimization problem
min
+ 
GX
f=1
[Af ( +  ) +Bf ]
0
[Af ( +  ) +Bf ]
leads to the rst order conditions0@ GX
f=1
A0fAf
1A ( +  )  GX
f=1
A0fBf = 0
that allow to nd the following expression for its solution
( +  ) =
0@ GX
f=1
A0fAf
1A 1 GX
f=1
A0fBf
7.2 Detailed proof of the manufacturers prot expression under two-
part tari¤s
We use the theoretical results due to Rey and Vergé (2004) applied to our context with F rms
and R retailers. The participation constraint (9) being binding, we have for all r
P
s2Sr
[(ps   ws  
cs)ss(p)  Fs] = r which implies that
X
s2Sr
Fs =
X
s2Sr
(ps   ws   cs)ss(p) r
and thus
X
j2Gf
Fj +
X
j 62Gf
Fj =
X
j=1;:;J
Fj =
X
r=1;:;R
X
s2Sr
Fs
=
X
r=1;:;R
X
s2Sr
(ps   ws   cs)ss(p) 
X
r=1;:;R

r
=
X
j=1;:;J
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p) 
X
r=1;:;R

r
so that X
j2Gf
Fj =
X
j=1;::;J
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p) 
X
j 62Gf
Fj  
X
r=1;:;R

r
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Then, the rm f prots are
f =
X
s2Gf
(ws   s)ss(p) +
X
s2Gf
Fs
=
X
s2Gf
(ws   s)ss(p) +
X
j=1;::;J
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p) 
X
j 62Gf
Fj  
X
r=1;:;R

r
Since, producers x the xed fees given the ones of other producers, we have that under resale
price maintenance :
max
fFi;pigi2Gf
f , max
fpigi2Gf
X
s2Gf
(ws   s)ss(p) +
X
j=1;::;J
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p)
, max
fpigi2Gf
X
s2Gf
(ps   s)ss(p) +
X
s62Gf
(ps   ws   cs)ss(p)
and with no resale price maintenance
max
fFi;wigi2Gf
f , max
fwigi2Gf
X
s2Gf
(ws   s)ss(p) +
X
j=1;::;J
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p)
, max
fwigi2Gf
X
s2Gf
(ps   s)ss(p) +
X
s62Gf
(ps   ws   cs)ss(p)
Then the rst order conditions of the di¤erent two part tari¤s models can be derived very simply.
7.3 First stage estimation
Dependent variable : pjt Coe¢ cient Std. Error
Wage index 0.0037 0.0008
Plastic price -0.0003 0.0008
Diesel oil price 0.0007 0.0004
b(j); r(j) are not shown
N 728
R2 0.98
Table 7 : First stage regression OLS regression of prices
7.4 Additional formula for the demand model (not for publication)
Remind that the average choice probability of buying j at period t is :
sjt =
1
N
XN
i=1
Pijt
=
1
N
XN
i=1
Z
Lijt(i)f(i)di
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The theoretical cross-price elasticity of demand of product j with respect to price of product k is
then
Ejk =
@sj
@pk
pk
sj
=
pk
sj

1
N
XN
i=1
@Pij
@pk

=
pk
sj

1
N
XN
i=1
Z
iLijt(i)Likt(i)f(i)di

which can be simulated using
SEjk =
pk
sj

1
N
XN
i=1

1
R
XR
r=1
rLijt(
r)Likt(
r)

Similarly, the theoretical own price elasticity is
Ejj =
@sj
@pj
pj
sj
=  pj
sj

1
N
XN
i=1
@Pij
@pj

=  pj
sj

1
N
XN
i=1
Z
iLijt(i) (1  Lijt(i)) f(i)di

which is simulated using
SEjj =  pj
sj

1
N
XN
i=1

1
R
XR
r=1
rLijt(
r) (1  Lijt(r))

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